

ADOLF HITLER

MEIN KAMPF

Complete and Unabridged
FULLY ANNOTATED

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John Chamberlain

Sidney B. Fay

John Gunther

Carlton J. H. Hayes

Graham Hutton

Alvin Johnson

William L. Langer

Walter Millis

Paul de Roussy de Sales

George N. Shuster



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PUBLISHERS' NOTE

BOOTH the international situation and certain publishing exigencies have dictated the preparation of this book at a far higher rate of speed than we should have liked. We wished it editorially to be, and we believe it is, a fine, scholarly, genuinely definitive edition of an enormously important book. If small errors have crept in, and we think even those are few and far between, they are due solely to the pressure of time.

We cannot possibly thank here by name all those who have assisted in the task. The work could not have been possible without the devoted help of our editorial committee, and notably Dr. Alvin Johnson, who has been a tower of strength in many directions. To Mr. George N. Shuster, who has labored with unwearying effectiveness night and day for many weeks, our debt is incalculable. Mr. Helmut Ripperger, on whom a heavy burden has fallen, and various friends and helpers at the New School for Social Research have likewise given without stint of their time and energy to the translation. Mr. C. H. Hand, Jr., will not like to find himself thus singled out, but we cannot overlook the tribute we owe him for his constant effective aid. Two other special friends of the enterprise who have been of enormous help, but who by their own wish shall be nameless, we none the less wish here to thank anonymously. Finally, to Houghton Mifflin Company we wish to extend our hearty salutations. We should never ask for more fair-minded or resourceful collaborators in a publishing enterprise.

E. R.
C. N. H.

INTRODUCTION

THIS is an accurate translation of a book which is likely to remain the most important political tract of our time, and which is now for the first time available in complete form to the American reader. Until now the only version of *Mein Kampf* in English has been a condensation of the complete book, published in 1933, containing less than half of the total text.

The Austrian and Czecho-Slovakian crises of last year, culminating for the moment in the pact of Munich, have awakened the American public as never before to the seriousness to the world and to themselves of the Nazi program, and consequently to the possible significance of every page of the book that can justly be regarded as the Nazi gospel. Here, then, in its entirety, for the American people to read and to judge for themselves, is the work which has sold in Germany by the millions, and which is probably the best written evidence of the character, the mind, and the spirit of Adolf Hitler and his government.

There are undoubtedly passages of great importance which now appear in English for the first time. For example, Chapter V of the condensed version left out the whole of what Hitler describes as his wartime reflections on propaganda and on methods for fighting Marxism. We have marked at various points in the text the important new material. Furthermore, any abridgment must necessarily fail, in proportion to the degree of its condensation, to give the full flavor of the author's mind. Even the repetitions have their significance in conveying a sense of the character behind them. *Mein Kampf* is, above all, a book of feeling.

Then, too, *Mein Kampf* is a propagandistic essay by a violent partisan. As such it often warps historical truth and sometimes ignores it completely. We have, therefore, felt it our duty to accompany the text with factual information which constitutes an extensive critique of the original. No American would like to assume responsibility for giving the public a text which, if not tested in the light of diligent inquiry, might convey the impression that Hitler was writing history rather than propaganda. It is more probable, however, that we shall have to face the opposite criticism — that we have been too impartial, too objective, too little concerned with rebuttal. To this we should like to reply that truth, the accurate truth, is the only argument which in the long run prevails. One may talk a fact out of existence for a time, but it somehow survives. We are prepared to rest our case as editors on our belief in that ultimate triumph.

One point in particular may need emphasis. Large portions of *Mein Kampf* are devoted to the question of race as a substructure on which to erect an anti-Semitic policy. We have not let these passages go unchallenged, but we have also not felt it necessary to include a discussion of race of our own invention. The greatest anthropologists of the twentieth century are agreed that 'race' is a practically meaningless word. All one can legitimately do, therefore, is to challenge statements of 'race history' as being figments of the imagination, and to point out that they are at bottom more or less subtle ways of supporting still more absolute and violent forms of nationalism than even the nineteenth century knew. In addition we have made specific objections to Hitler's anti-Semitic statements where they contradict known historical facts.

A word now concerning the method adopted for the presentation of the notes. As a rule we have put information relative to the sources and origins of National Socialism

German war fleet. Concentration of the State's entire means of power in the land army.

The result would certainly have been a momentary restriction, but a great and powerful future.

There was a time when England would have permitted herself to engage in discussions such as these. She understood quite well that Germany, in consequence of her increase in population, had to look for some way out, and would find this either with England's co-operation in Europe, or without England in the world.

It was attributable, probably, to this idea that at the turn of the century London herself tried to approach Germany. In those days there appeared for the first time that which we have had an opportunity of observing in a really terrifying manner in these times. One was unpleasantly affected

off against arguments that stress the difficulties in the way. Equally important as a factor is the growing similarity between the Russian and the German régimes, now often pointed out. During 1920, a Social Democratic commission went from Germany to study the actual achievements of the Soviet system. The report then issued by one of its members, Wilhelm Dittmann, corresponds strikingly with any of the number of reports on the Nazi system now being written by observers of the same school.

Rosenberg and others have been convinced that British support could be gained for any serious attempt to undermine the Russian system and therewith stamp out the Third International as a fomenter of world revolution. Two reasons for this conviction are usually advanced. The first is the support received by White Russian revolutionists from English sources, which support has occasionally been deflected to Hitler. The second is the feud long since in progress between certain British financiers and the Soviet system. Sir Henry Deterding, the oil magnate, was the most manifest of the partisans of Germany; and

by the idea that now one would have to 'pull the chestnuts out of the fire' for England; as if an alliance were at all conceivable on a basis other than that of mutual business transactions! Such a business could very well have been done with England. British diplomacy was still clever enough to know that, without reciprocal service, no service could be expected.

Imagine that a clever German foreign policy assumed Japan's rôle in 1904, and one can hardly realize what consequences this would have had for Germany.

It would never have come to a 'World War.'

The blood of the year 1904 would have saved the tenfold amount of the years 1914 till 1918.

But what position would Germany have in the world today?

To be sure, the alliance with Austria was an absurdity in that case.

Because this mummy of a State did not unite with Germany in order to fight a war, but rather for the conservation of eternal peace, which then could have been cleverly used for the slow but certain extinction of the German nation in the monarchy.

This alliance, however, was an impossibility, for the reason that one could not expect official representation of national German interests on the part of a State, so long as it had not even the power and the determination to make

the reader can surmise the existence of other connections if he studies *Ourselves and Germany*, by Lord Londonderry. Doubtless a more important factor has been the British endeavor to deflect a war — if there must be war — from western Europe. Yet, however willing London might be to let Germany become entangled in the East, the chances have grown less and less impressive that any support for such a maneuver would be forthcoming.